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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1798 
_____________ 
 
ANNIE E. ARRINGTON, 
                                  Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-15-cv-6750) 
District Judge:  Hon. Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2018 
 
Before:   JORDAN, ROTH, Circuit Judges and MARIANI*, District Judge. 
 
(Filed: January 31, 2018) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION∗∗ 
_______________ 
                                              
 * Honorable Robert D. Mariani, United States District Court Judge for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
 ∗∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Annie Arrington appeals from the grant of summary judgment against her on her 
claim that the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) violated the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and her further 
claim that Amtrak’s negligence caused her injuries.  We will affirm. 
I. Background1 
 Arrington was a passenger on an Amtrak train traveling between Pennsylvania and 
North Carolina when she fell as the train “jerked.”  (App. at 90.)  Arrington identified 
herself as “mobility impaired” when she purchased her train ticket.  (App. at 537.)  At 
that time, she walked with the assistance of a cane because of a pre-existing condition 
affecting her back.  She did not, however, “need the cane continuously, only when [she] 
was having problems.”  (App. at 381.) 
 When Arrington boarded the Amtrak train in Pennsylvania, Amtrak employees 
directed her to a seat in the handicap-accessible section of the train car because her ticket 
identified her as requiring an “accessible” seat due to her self-identified mobility 
impairment.  Arrington was carrying her cane when she boarded the train, but she did not 
use it while walking to her seat.   
 As it turned out, Amtrak employees directed Arrington and others to a handicap-
accessible section in the wrong train car, given that their ultimate destination was in 
                                              
1  We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  See infra 
note 2. 
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North Carolina.  So, while the train was traveling between Wilmington, Delaware and 
Baltimore, Maryland, an Amtrak conductor told those passengers that they were seated in 
the wrong car and would have to move to a different one.  Arrington informed the 
conductor that she could not get up and walk to a different car while the train was 
moving.  The conductor replied that Arrington could wait until the train arrived in 
Baltimore before moving to her new seat because the train would stop in Baltimore for 
five minutes.  Before the train reached Baltimore, though, Arrington observed the 
passengers seated with her in the handicap-accessible section moving to the other train 
car without assistance.  She decided, as she noticed the train slowing down, to get up and 
move to her new seat.  She did not ask for assistance, and, in fact, declined assistance 
from a fellow passenger.  Arrington testified that the train was stopped when she got out 
of her seat but that she did not know if the train had arrived in Baltimore, and she did not 
see any other passengers in the aisle, apart from those waiting in line for the restroom.  
She said that there was no reason she attempted to move seats before the train reached 
Baltimore.   
 Arrington fell as she was walking down the aisle as a result of what she described 
as a “hard” and “long” jerk.  (App. at 332.).  After she fell, the Amtrak conductor who 
had previously told her she could wait until Baltimore to switch seats came over and 
offered to help Arrington off the floor.  Arrington replied that she could not get up right 
away and remained on the floor for a couple minutes.  When Arrington was ready to be 
helped into a seat, the conductor helped her get off the floor and into a nearby seat and 
told Arrington to move to the appropriate train car when she was ready.  Arrington later 
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walked to her new handicap-accessible seat in the other train car without asking for or 
receiving assistance.   
  Prior to this incident, Arrington independently pursued a wide range of everyday 
activities.  She testified, “I did everything I had for myself.  I cooked.  I went shopping.  I 
did all my own shopping.  For a long time I did my own grass [by riding mower], but 
then I got somebody to start cutting my grass because it got to be too much for me.”  
(App. at 395.)  She was also active in religious organizations and did water aerobics at a 
senior center.   
 Arrington sued Amtrak for violations of the ADA and for negligence arising out of 
her fall.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Amtrak on those 
claims, and Arrington appeals that judgment.   
II. Discussion2 
 We agree with the District Court’s thorough analysis and conclusion that 
Arrington failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA and that 
the record contains no evidence to support Arrington’s negligence claim. 
                                              
2  The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332 and federal 
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1349.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Deweese v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 590 F.3d 239, 244 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and if the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).  In reviewing a summary judgment ruling, 
we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 248-49. 
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 A. ADA Claim3 
 “Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in public 
services, programs, and activities.”  Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2015).  To succeed on an ADA discrimination 
claim, a plaintiff must establish that she is a qualified individual with a disability; that she 
was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, or 
was discriminated against by a public entity; and that such exclusion, denial, or 
discrimination was by reason of her disability.  42 U.S.C. § 12132; Disability Rights N.J., 
796 F.3d at 301.  There is no dispute that Amtrak is a public entity subject to Title II of 
the ADA. 
 Arrington argues that she has established she is a qualified individual with a 
disability because she presented evidence that she has a long history of orthopedic 
impairments.  The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities …; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]”4  42 U.S.C. § 12102.  
                                              
 3  Arrington’s complaint appears, on its face, to state only a negligence claim.  It 
invokes the ADA only in a passing reference to Amtrak’s alleged failure to train its 
employees pursuant to that statute in a sub-paragraph in support of her negligence claim.  
Although the civil cover sheet filed with the complaint indicated Arrington intended to 
bring a claim under the ADA, it invoked the District Court’s diversity jurisdiction, not its 
federal question jurisdiction.  The parties and the District Court, however, liberally 
construed Arrington’s complaint to contain an ADA claim and we will do likewise and 
review the resolution of that claim.  
 
 4  Arrington does not argue that her impairment qualifies as a disability under 
subpart (C), which does not require a plaintiff to prove a substantial limitation on a major 
life activity.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).  We note, however, that even if Arrington could 
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Walking is considered a major life activity.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i).  An individual is 
substantially limited in performing a major life activity if that individual is unable to 
pursue that major life activity in a comparable manner “to most people in the general 
population.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that Arrington does not have a qualifying disability because she has not pointed to any 
record evidence demonstrating that she was substantially limited in any major life 
activity, including walking.  In fact, she testified that, at the time of the incident, she 
could do everything on her own.   
 Arrington further argues that Amtrak discriminated against her when its 
employees failed to provide assistance when she was moving between train cars.  The 
record evidence demonstrates that Amtrak provided Arrington with the one 
accommodation she actually requested – a seat in a handicapped section.  Amtrak did not 
deny Arrington assistance to which she was entitled when she got up to move between 
seats; she never asked for any assistance.  An Amtrak conductor specifically told 
Arrington that she could wait until the train reached the station in Baltimore before 
moving to her new seat.  Amtrak was under no statutory obligation to preemptively offer 
her assistance on the chance she would get up prior to the train reaching Baltimore.  We 
agree with the District Court that the record contains no evidence that allows for a finding 
                                              
demonstrate that her impairment was a qualifying disability, she would still fail to make 
out a prima facie claim of discrimination because she cannot demonstrate that Amtrak 
discriminated against her or denied her any benefits or services to which she was entitled.  
See infra pp. 6-7. 
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that Amtrak discriminated against Arrington or denied her any benefits or services to 
which she was entitled.   
 Accordingly, Arrington has not established a prima facie case of discrimination 
under the ADA. 
 B. Negligence Claim5 
 To state a claim for negligence under Pennsylvania law, “the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant had a duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct; that the 
defendant breached that duty; that such breach caused the injury in question; and actual 
loss or damage.”  Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1008 (Pa. 2003) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Pennsylvania holds common carriers, such as Amtrak, “to 
the highest duty of care.”  LeGrand v. Lincoln Lines, Inc., 384 A.2d 955, 956 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1978).  When a common carrier “accepts as a passenger a person known to [have] … 
a physical … disability,” a common carrier “must exercise a greater degree of care for 
that passenger than is ordinarily required.”  Id. 
 The record does not support that Amtrak breached its duty to conform to a 
heightened duty of care.  As discussed above, an Amtrak conductor told Arrington she 
                                              
 5  As the District Court noted, both parties rely exclusively on Pennsylvania state 
law when discussing Arrington’s negligence claim, despite the fact that Arrington’s fall 
occurred while the train was in Maryland.  The Court applied Pennsylvania law after it 
determined that “the law with respect to the duty owed … a passenger on a common 
carrier is the same in both Pennsylvania, where [Arrington] boarded the train, and in 
Maryland, where [Arrington’s] injury occurred.”  (App. at 16 (comparing Wash. Metro. 
Area Transit Auth. v. Djan, 979 A.2d 194, 196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) with Connolly 
v. Phila. Transp. Co., 216 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1966)).)  Because we agree with the District 
Court on that point and because no party objected to the application of Pennsylvania law, 
we too apply Pennsylvania law. 
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could wait to move until the train reached the station in Baltimore.   Instead of waiting 
until the train reached Baltimore, Arrington attempted to move to her new seat before the 
train got to Baltimore, without asking for any assistance.  The common law, just like the 
ADA, placed no affirmative duty on Amtrak to predict that Arrington would get up to 
move to her new seat before the train stopped and to preemptively offer assistance she 
had not requested.6  We agree with the District Court that Arrington’s negligence claim 
fails as a matter of law.7   
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Amtrak. 
                                              
 6  Arrington appears to argue that Amtrak was negligent because its employees 
failed to conform to Amtrak’s own policies.  The policies contained in the record, 
however, do not require Amtrak employees to predict when a passenger seated in a 
handicap-accessible seat might need assistance going from one seat to another.  Rather, 
the policies state that “[i]ndividuals with disabilities should notify the ticket agent in 
advance of any special accommodations needed … on-board the train.”  (App. at 564.)  
And, while the policies explicitly state that “[p]assengers may notify the crew at any time 
that they have a disability and will need special assistance,” (App. at 564 (emphasis 
omitted)), as explained above, Arrington never asked for assistance. 
 
 7  The Court also concluded that Arrington’s negligence claim failed by operation 
of Pennsylvania’s “jerk or jolt” doctrine.  (App. at 18.)  That doctrine precludes a finding 
of negligence against a common carrier based only on a common carrier’s sudden 
movement unless the plaintiff can demonstrate the sudden movement was particularly 
unusual and extraordinary.  Connolly, 216 A.2d at 62.  Arrington argues that doctrine 
does not apply when a common carrier is transporting an individual it knows to be 
disabled.  We do not reach that issue because it is clear to us that Arrington’s negligence 
claim fails as a matter of law regardless of the applicability of the “jerk or jolt” doctrine. 
